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Abstract 
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has increasingly been relying on interest 
rates as the instrument for conducting monetary policy. Changes to the key 
monetary policy variables, the Repo and the Reverse Repo rates, are initially 
expected to be reflected in the OMO auction rates and the call money market rates, 
before being passed-through to commercial bank retail interest rates. It is 
important to obtain a good understanding of the speed and magnitude of the interest 
rate pass-through to make timely monetary policy decisions in order to meet the 
objective of economic and price stability. This paper examines the size and speed of 
the pass-through from policy interest rates to call money market rates and from call 
money market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates. The paper concludes 
that the CBSL policy decisions are efficiently transmitted to the short end of the 
money market within a matter of days. Also, the pass-through from policy interest 
rates to the call money market rate is almost complete. However, the pass-through 
from call money market rates to both lending rates and deposit interest rates of 
commercial banks is sluggish and incomplete. The only exception is, perhaps, the 
rates on lending to prime customers, which show a faster and a fuller pass-through. 
Also, there is no evidence of an asymmetry of pass-through over different phases of 
the interest rate cycle. 
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1. Background 
Introduction 
 During the Past few decades, interest rate has become the most important policy instrument 
used by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) in its monetary operations. The CBSL has gradually 
moved away from non-market oriented policy instruments to the use of policy interest rates as a 
market oriented framework in the conduct of the country‟s monetary policy. This has been an 
evolutionary process where the CBSL introduced the Repurchase (Repo) facility in October 1993, 
Reverse Repurchase (Reverse Repo) facility in November 1998 and more active open market 
operations (OMO) in March 2003. 
 Interest rate is a key channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, through which 
a central bank attempts to influence the short-term money market interest rates, and thereby the 
commercial bank lending and deposit rates, in order to curtail inflationary pressures while providing 
adequate lubrication for economic growth. The success of the interest rate channel in conducting 
monetary policy operations primarily depends on the speed of adjustment of market interest rates and 
the degree of pass-through. A quicker and fuller pass-through of policy rates and market interest rates 
to retail bank interest rates strengthens monetary policy transmission.  
Researchers have observed that interest rate pass-through is often not an immediate 
adjustment and usually not a one-for-one change. Therefore, with the market orientation of the 
conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka, with policy interest rates as the key monetary policy 
instrument, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the interest rate pass-through process. A 
clear perception of this process could be quite important for the timing of monetary policy action.   
 The aim of the present study is to address three issues relating to the interest rate pass-through 
process in Sri Lanka. These are as follows: 
1. Is there a one-to-one pass-through from policy interest rates to call money market rates or else, at 
what rate does a unit change in policy rates impact upon the call money market rates in the short-
run and in the long-run? 
2. Is there a one-to-one pass-through from call money market rates to commercial bank retail interest 
rates (lending rates / deposit rates) or else, at what rate does a unit change in call money market 
rates impact upon the commercial bank retail interest rates in the short-run and in the long-run? 
3. Is there an asymmetry of pass-through during different phases of an interest rate cycle? In other 
words, is the pass-through of rising interest rates significantly different from the pass-through of 
falling interest rates? 
In order to analyse these issues, this paper is organised as follows: The rest of this chapter 
explains the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and in particular, the interest rate channel of 
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monetary policy transmission. It will also introduce the concepts of interest rate pass-through and 
interest rate stickiness and provide a brief background of the use of interest rates as a key instrument 
in the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka. Chapter 2 will review the existing literature on the 
subject and discuss the nature of the pass-through in other countries as measured by other researchers. 
Deriving from the research methodologies adopted by international researchers, Chapter 3 will discuss 
the data and statistical and econometric tools used in this study while in Chapter 4 data are analysed 
and the findings of the analyses are outlined. Chapter 5 will wrap up the discussion on the interest rate 
pass-through.  
Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission and Transmission Lag 
 The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is defined as how changes to the monetary 
policy instruments of a central bank affect changes in price levels and output of a country. This is a 
process that works through several economic and financial variables in an economy. Economists often 
refer to five channels of monetary policy transmission, which are usually interrelated. These channels 
are 
 a) Interest rate channel, 
b) Exchange rate channel, 
c) Other asset effect channel, 
d) Credit channel, and 
e) Expectations. 
 
The interest rate channel is the traditional monetary policy transmission channel as explained 
by Keynesians. Under this channel, monetary expansion along with associated decline in interest 
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rates, lower the cost of borrowing for firms and consumers leading to increased investment and 
consumption. This increases aggregate demand and output gap leading to increasing prices and 
inflation.  
 The exchange rate channel can work through either net exports or import prices. Increased 
money supply lowers the interest rate leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate. This increases 
competitiveness improving the trade balance as well as generating higher demand. The depreciation of 
the exchange rate also raises import prices, which directly affect the price level, thus creating 
inflation.  
 The asset price channel has two channels involving Tobin‟s q theory of investment and wealth 
effects on consumption. Lower interest rates increase the present value of future income flows and 
therefore asset prices. This raises wealth, which will affect demand. Increased wealth may also 
increase bank lending by reducing problems related to asymmetric information between banks and 
firms.  
 The credit channel is of two types, i.e., bank lending and balance sheet channels. Bank 
lending is important for small firms and consumers who cannot raise their own funds. Balance sheet 
channel is based on the principle that healthier balance sheets lead to freer borrowing conditions.  
 Expectations about the future stance of monetary policy are also important as a transmission 
channel. If economic agents believe that the current policy is inappropriate, it leads to creating 
expectations about future actions of the central bank. Inflation expectations also matter in shaping the 
monetary transmission mechanism.  
There is neither an agreement among economists on the existence of the five channels 
mentioned above nor with regard to the importance of these monetary policy transmission channels. 
This is because the importance of each channel differs from economy to economy, from time to time 
and under different circumstances. Not only the importance but also the speed and the size of the 
effect of each channel are not constant. However, if monetary policy actions are to become successful, 
a central bank needs to have a proper assessment of the working of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism through various channels of an economy. As Mishkin (1996) emphasized, “[a]n 
understanding of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is essential to understand what 
monetary policy can and should do and at what point in time, actions should be undertaken to contain 
or offset disturbances that could threaten the achievement of the targets.” 
Changes to monetary policy variables do not transmit to other economic variables 
instantaneously. On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that the effects of monetary policy work 
are felt on the final targets after long and variable lags. Figure 2 explains the lags in monetary policy 
transmission as shown by Vaish (2000).  
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 The inside lag is the time lag within the central bank between the time when action is needed 
and the time when action is practically implemented. The intermediate lag is known to be the lag 
between the time when the central bank takes action and the time when a sufficient effect on interest 
rates and other credit conditions to influence the spending decisions of economic agents significantly. 
The outside lag is the lag between the time when changes in interest rates and other credit conditions 
occur and the time when the initial impact of these changes is reflected in price levels and output of 
the economy.  
Modelling the entire monetary policy transmission mechanism is an enormous task. 
Therefore, the focus of this paper is limited to analysing the initial stages of the interest rate channel 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Within this framework, emphasis is made on the 
intermediate lag where monetary policy action is transmitted to the retail market interest rates.  
Interest Rate channel, Pass-through and Stickiness  
 The interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission has a long history which goes back 
to the times of Keynes. Initially, this channel was considered to be affecting price levels and output 
through firms‟ business decisions on investment decisions, but later the scope has been broadened to 
capture consumer decisions on expenditure on housing and consumer durables as well. According to 
Mishkin (1996), the emphasis of the interest rate channel is on the real rather than the nominal interest 
rate and often on the real long-term interest rate and not the short term interest rate, “since it is the real 
long term interest rate that is viewed as having the major impact on spending”. Although some 
economists, such as Bernanke have shown that the existence of a separate interest rate channel has 
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been undermined by the fact that there is a stronger credit channel, some others such as Taylor (1995) 
have indicated that there is strong evidence to establish the existence of a strong interest rate channel 
working through consumption and investment.  
 With increased reputation of policy interest rates as the main monetary policy instrument in 
many economies, it is essential that a central bank make required adjustments to its policy interest rate 
at present in order to achieve monetary policy objectives in the future. Movements of the policy 
interest rates are expected to influence the entire term structure of market interest rates, although in 
practice, it has been observed that while short-term market interest rates adjust more closely with the 
changes to the policy interest rates, the impact on long term rates depends on inflation expectations 
following the adjustments in the policy rates.  
Most literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy implicitly assumes that 
once a central bank‟s policy rate is changed, short-term market and retail banking rates will follow 
suit, i.e., that there will be immediate and complete “pass-through” to commercial bank rates. Interest 
rate pass-through is generally defined as the extent to which changes in central bank policy interest 
rates and/or money market interest rates are reflected in changes in commercial bank retail interest 
rates, both in the short-run and the long-run. A full pass-through is said to take place when a 
movement in the policy interest rates/money market interest rates leads to a one-for-one change in 
commercial bank interest rates.  
If the pass-through to bank interest rates demonstrates “stickiness”, i.e., pass-through is 
sluggish and incomplete, the channels of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy that operate 
through bank rates will also be affected. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have shown that the term 
“interest rate stickiness” has usually taken two distinct meanings. “First, it has been used to indicate 
that bank rates are relatively inelastic with respect to shifts in the demand for bank loans and deposits. 
Second, it has been used to indicate that, in the presence of a change of money market rates, bank 
rates change by a smaller amount in the short-run (short-run stickiness), and possible also in the long-
run (long-run stickiness).” It is in the latter context the term “stickiness” is used in this paper.  
Interest Rate as a Policy Instrument in Sri Lanka 
The Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949 has provided the CBSL an array of policy instruments 
which could be used in the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka. These vary from market oriented 
policy instruments to non market oriented instruments and include the statutory reserve ratio (SRR) 
on commercial bank deposit liabilities,  Bank rate, OMO, foreign exchange operations, refinance 
facilities, quantitative restrictions on credit, and ceilings on interest rates.  
However, along with international trends in central banking, Sri Lanka too has witnessed a 
continuous shift from non market oriented policy instruments to market oriented ones. In this regard, 
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the CBSL has increasingly been relying on interest rates as the instrument for conducting monetary 
policy in Sri Lanka.  
The Central Bank‟s key monetary policy interest rates are the Repo rate, the Reverse Repo 
rate, and the Bank rate. The first two are closely linked to market rates, while the latter is more or less 
a non-market oriented indicative rate. The Repo rate is the rate at which commercial banks and 
primary dealers can invest their surplus funds in Government securities and Central Bank securities 
held by the CBSL, while the Reverse Repo rate is the rate at which commercial banks and primary 
dealers can obtain funds from the Central Bank by pledging their own holdings of Government 
securities to the Central Bank. The Bank rate is defined as the rate at which the Central Bank grants 
advances to commercial banks to meet their temporary liquidity requirements as the lender of last 
resort, but this rate has not been used since 1985. 
The Repo and the Reverse Repo rate are expected to facilitate reducing excess volatility in the 
inter-bank overnight money market thereby providing stability to the money market. Meanwhile 
changes to these policy interest rates are the Central Bank‟s signaling mechanism to indicate the 
expected direction of interest rates in the market. With the adoption of the free floating exchange rate 
regime in January 2001, the CBSL has been allowed more freedom in using policy interest rates as the 
key monetary policy instrument in Sri Lanka. Figure 3 shows the behaviour of daily interest rates 
between December 1996 and February 2003 and highlights how interest rates in the call money 
market have stabilized following the floating of the exchange rate in early 2001.     
 
 
 
Marking a major change in the manner in which the CBSL implements its monetary policy, 
the Bank switched to a more market based active open market operations (active OMO) framework 
with effects from 03 March 2003. Under this system, the Repo and the Reverse Repo rates form the 
corridor in which the overnight market operates, while participants in the money market are expected 
to play a more active role in setting the operational interest rate within the policy interest rate corridor. 
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The weighted average rate at the daily auctions suggests that there is adequate liquidity in the money 
market if the rate is close to the Repo rate, while suggesting the existence of liquidity shortages if the 
rate is close to the Reverse Repo rate. Standing facilities are available to participants either at the 
Repo rate or Reverse Repo rate, depending on their liquidity conditions. Figure 4 shows the behaviour 
of the daily overnight money market interest rates since 03 March 2003 up to 31 December 2004.      
 
By influencing money market interest rate at the short end of the market, the CBSL expects 
the interest rate adjustments to be reflected in commercial bank retail interest rates. Commercial bank 
prime lending rates and other lending rates as well as commercial bank deposit rates both on savings 
as well as term deposits are also expected to adjust. Figure 5 plots the behaviour of some commercial 
bank deposit and lending rates against the call money market rate between the period from June 1990 
to December 2004.    
 
In summary, changes to the key monetary policy variables, the Repo and the Reverse Repo 
rates, are initially expected to be reflected in the OMO auction rates and the call money market rates. 
This initial transmission from the policy interest rates to overnight money market rates is shaped by 
the efficiency of the financial market as well as the liquidity conditions of the money market. While a 
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speedy and complete pass-through indicates the existence of an efficient money market, sluggish and 
imperfect adjustments indicate inefficiencies. Also, resultant adjustments in retail lending and deposit 
rates of commercial banks are good indicators of the efficiency of the banking and financial system. 
Since all these factors affect the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism of the CBSL it is 
essential that a good understanding of this interest rate pass-through process is obtained so that timely 
monetary policy decisions could be made to meet the objective of economic and price stability.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Given the importance of the interest rate pass-through process to the conduct of monetary 
policy, several researchers have ventured to measure its speed and magnitude using time-series, cross 
sectional and panel data. Early models included analysing price rigidities under oligopolistic market 
models, while there has been a series of recent literature on interest rate pass-through processes of 
several economies using autoregressive distributed lag models, structural vector auto-regression 
models and error correction models. In this section, an attempt is made to review several of landmark 
research work on the subject. A summary of data and models used by these researchers is provided at 
the end of this chapter. 
An early work on price rigidities in the banking industry could be found in Hannan and 
Berger (1991). They focused on the setting of deposit interest rates by banks and addressed the issue 
of asymmetry between upward and downward price changes using a multinomial logit estimation 
procedure. Their primary findings were that price rigidity is significantly greater in markets 
characterised by higher levels of concentration and that deposit rates are significantly more rigid when 
the stimulus for a change is upward rather than downward. 
Lowe and Rohling (1992) summarized four theoretical explanations in addition to 
oligopolistic behaviour for loan rate stickiness. These theories are based on equilibrium credit 
rationing, switching costs, implicit risk sharing, and consumer irrationality. They also examined the 
degree of stickiness of Australian lending rates, and observed that there are significant differences in 
the degree of interest rate stickiness among different rates, even after allowing for lags in adjustment. 
Lowe and Rohling concluded that although it is not possible to empirically discriminate between the 
different theories of loan rate stickiness, their results provide strong evidence for the switching cost 
explanation.  
Research work by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) has provided the bases for several 
subsequent works by other researchers on interest rate stickiness. Cottarelli and Kourelis analysed the 
degree of lending rate stickiness in 31 industrial and developing countries by estimating simple 
dynamic models in order to provide a systematic measure of the different degree of lending rate 
stickiness across countries. They regressed the lending rate in each country against lagged values of 
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money market and discount rates and measured the degree of lending rate stickiness by looking at the 
response of lending rates following a change in money market rates at different time lags by 
estimating impact, interim and long term multipliers. Cottarelli and Kourelis attributed the different 
degree of lending rate stickiness to structural features of the financial system, such as the existence of 
barriers to competition, the degree of development of financial markets, and the ownership structure 
of the banking system.  
Borio and Fritz (1995) examined the relationship between the monetary policy rate, money 
market rate and the lending rate for a group of OECD countries. They observed that, in the short-run, 
some countries show a high degree of pass-through, while some others show a high degree of interest 
rate stickiness. However, in the long-run, the pass-through is more homogenous across countries and 
it gets closer to 1. They also found that changes in money market rates takes three months and two 
years to be completely transmitted to retail interest rates.  
 In 1999, Moazzami examined the short-run and long-run impacts of changes in money market 
rates on lending in Canada and the United States using an error-correction modeling framework, 
which distinguishes short term impacts from long-run or full equilibrium effects. Moazzami also 
specified an autoregressive distributed lag model to allow for the presence of lags in the adjustment of 
lending rates to changes in the money market rates 
Winker (1999) combined model with credit rationing due to asymmetric information with a 
marginal cost pricing to bank behaviour to explain the adjustment of deposit and loan rates to changes 
of the money market rate. It was observed that the hypothesis that deposit and loan rates do not adapt 
immediately to changes in the money market rate cannot be rejected based on German monthly data.  
Measuring the pass-through for several bank credit and deposit rates for each of the six largest 
countries in the euro area, Mojon (2000) assumed that there is full pass-through in the long-run and 
concentrated on estimating its size in the short term. His main findings were that retail rates respond 
sluggishly to changes in the money market rate, short-term rates generally respond faster than long-
term rates, and there is asymmetry in the degree of pass-through, in particular, the pass-through to 
lending rates is larger when the money market rate increases than when it decreases, while the 
opposite is true for the deposit rates. Mojon showed that for both credit and deposit rates, the higher 
the volatility of the money market rate the lower the pass-through. Higher competition from other 
sources of finance or alternative forms of investment increases the pass-through from the money 
market rate to bank rates. According to Mojon, competition also reduces the banks‟ ability to smooth 
their interest rate margin across the interest rate cycle, thereby reducing the interest rate cycle 
asymmetry of the pass-through.  
Toolsema, Strum and de Haan (2001) examined how the pass-through of monetary policy 
measures in six EMU countries has evolved over time and whether there is convergence in monetary 
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transmission. In doing so, they built up on Cottarelli and Kourelis model and concluded that major 
differences in pass-through exist between these countries, both in terms of initial as well as long-run 
responses to policy induced interest rate changes. They found no indication for convergence of 
monetary policy transmission among the six countries. 
In 2001, Donnay and Degryse investigated the pass-through from the money market rate to 
several bank lending rates and the government bond rates for twelve European countries. They 
applied SVAR based on the Cholesky decomposition in conducting their analysis.  
Heinemann and Schüler (2001) argued that national differences of the pass-through speed in 
the EU could be regarded as a retail-oriented indicator of financial integration. The speed of interest 
rate adjustments in the EU retail credit markets for different markets and countries is measured and 
results showed a considerable fragmentation of markets. They used simulations to show how much 
consumers in some countries could gain from a convergence of adjustment speed on the faster levels.  
In 2002, Bredin, Fitzpatrick and O Reilly examined the extent to which changes in the money 
market interest rate are passed-through to a number of retail lending rates in Ireland. They also 
analysed the speed of adjustment of these lending rates with respect to changes in the money market 
rate. They found that there is no complete pass-through from the money market rate to lending rates 
and the speed of adjustment varies quite considerably across alternative lending rates. They also 
showed that there has been significant structural change in the relationship between the Irish money 
market rate and lending rates both in terms of pass-through and speed of adjustment over time. 
Using evidence from the Chilean banking industry, Berstein and Fuentes concluded that there 
is some sluggishness of adjustments of the bank-lending rates to changes in policy rate. By using data 
at the bank level, they explored factors that influence the degree of delay in market interest rate 
responses to changes in the policy rate, and found that the size of the bank, type of customers and the 
loan risk level are important characteristics that determine the speed and size of the pass-through.  
Weth (2002) analysed the relationships between German bank lending rates and both money 
market and capital market rates in the 1990s. This study revealed evidence of structural differences in 
the interest rate pass-through across German banks. Weth related the speed at which bank lending 
rates adjust to changes in market rates to a credit institution‟s size, its refinancing conditions and the 
extent of its business with non-banks. He concluded that by smoothing their rates, banks appear to be 
accepting temporary fluctuations in their loan mark-up, which, in turn, tend to retard monetary policy 
transmission via bank rates.  
Examining the retail bank interest rate pass-through process in the euro area, de Bondt (2002) 
showed that the immediate pass-through of market interest rates to retail bank interest rates is 
incomplete, in line with previous cross country studies. The empirical results suggested a quicker 
retail interest rate pass-through process since the introduction of the Euro. Using an error correction 
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model of the interest rate pass-through process based on a marginal cost pricing framework including 
switching and asymmetric information costs, he estimated that the proportion of a given market 
interest rate change that is passed-through within one month to be around 50 per cent and close to 100 
per cent in the long term. 
Mizen and Hofmann (2002) provided a theoretical and econometric framework for assessing 
the evidence of the assumption of complete pass-through using 14 years of monthly data for interest 
rates on deposit and mortgage products offered by UK banks and building societies. The method 
employed allows for asymmetries and non-linearities in adjustment and the results show that the 
speed of adjustment in retail rates depends on whether the perceived „gap‟ between retail and base 
rates is widening or narrowing.  
Research work conducted by Petro, McDermott and Tripe explored the relationship between 
the New Zealand official cash rate (OCR), money market interest rates and financial intermediaries‟ 
lending margins. They looked at the difference in the degree of pass-through before and after OCR 
implementation and the extent to which a change in money market rates is passed-through to banks‟ 
housing lending rates. They also observed that since the introduction of OCR, there has been a 
significant decline in the volatility of both underlying money market rates and margins. 
Using Markov switching regime systems that allows for asymmetries and non-linearities in 
the parameters, Humala (2003) modelled the dynamic relationship between money market rate and 
different short term lending rates in the banking system of Argentina. He observed that under normal 
financial conditions short-run stickiness is higher for those rates on loans with higher credit risk.  
Burgstaller (2003) examined dynamic responses of commercial credit rates to changes in key 
policy rates and money market rates using Austrian data from 1995 to 2002. He showed that the 
strength and speed of interest rate transmission depend on whether rates go up or down. However, 
with the establishment of EMU this asymmetry in interest rate transmission has partly declined and 
the speed of transmission and the relative importance of policy and money market rates for 
commercial credit rates too have been affected.  
With the objective of testing whether Chile‟s pass-through is atypical Espinosa-Vega and 
Rebucci (2003) investigated empirically the pass-through of money market interest rates to retail 
banking interest rates in Chile, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and five European countries.  
They estimated both the size and the speed of the pass-through from policy to retail banking rates, in 
the short-run (on impact, within a month) and in the long-run (in the steady state) for Chile They 
compared the results with a number of other countries and concluded that as in most countries 
considered in their study, Chile‟s measured pass-through is incomplete but does not appear atypical. 
They also found no significant evidence of asymmetry in Chile‟s pass-through across states of the 
interest rate or monetary policy cycle.  
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Kleimeier and Sander (2003) used a generalized empirical approach that allows for a variety 
of different specifications of the pass-through, including asymmetric adjustment, the role of interest 
rate expectations, in determining retail banking product pricing in the Eurozone. They showed that the 
pass-through is faster when monetary policy changes are correctly anticipated. However, this result is 
limited to the loan market and more pronounced for positive interest rate shocks, while particularly 
deposit rates are found to be rigid, suggesting an important role of competitive banking markets for 
the pass-through process.  
In 2004, Tieman aimed to test the hypothesis that the interest rate pass-through from policy to 
market rates plays a lesser role in Romania than in other transition economies in the region. Results 
for data series on newly issued loans suggest that market rates for new loans react to policy rate 
changes quite fast and in most cases almost one-to-one, and confirmed that transmission in Romania 
is similar to that of its neighbours. Analysis of the Romanian loans market for different time periods 
strongly suggested that the interest rate pass-through from policy to market rates has become more 
pronounced over time. 
Having reviewed a selection of literature on the experience of interest rate pass-through in 
different countries, it is now appropriate to explore existing findings on interest rate pass-through in 
Sri Lanka.  
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), in their analysis of interest rate pass-through in 31 countries, 
computed the 3 months, 6 months and long-run multipliers to be 0.22, 0.28, and 0.30, respectively as 
against average 3 months, 6 months and long-run multipliers of 0.64, 0.77 and 0.97, indicating 
extremely slow and incomplete pass-through both in the short-run and long-run in Sri Lanka.  
To evaluate money market efficiency in Sri Lanka, Mahadeva and Thenuwara (1999/2000) 
employed several econometric tests, particularly one that was based on the co-integration properties 
of market interest rates and monetary policy rates. They were of the view that if markets are efficient 
the market rates and policy rates should be co-integrated implying that market rates respond to policy 
rates. Results indicated that call money rates are not co-integrated with any deposit rate, but the 
market rediscount rate is co-integrated with especially the shorter interest rates. Mahadeva and 
Thenuwara found that the pass-through coefficients were much lower than one and lower than those 
of other countries, indicating significant inefficiencies in the Sri Lankan money market “imposing 
serious drawbacks in the propagation of policy changes to the final target variable”.    
More recently, the International Monetary Fund (2004) quantified interest rate pass-through in 
analysing monetary transmission mechanism in Sri Lanka. They concluded that changes in policy 
rates appear to translate into changes in market-determined interest rates. Using simple OLS 
regressions and Treasury bill rates with maturities of 3, 6 and 12 months, they showed that changes 
are transmitted quickly throughout all maturities, with shorter maturity rates responding the fastest.  
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In concluding this chapter, data and models used in research work highlighted so far in 
analysing the interest rate pass-through process are summarised in Table 1: 
Table 1: 
Data and Techniques used 
in Previous Research on the Interest Rate Pass-through Process 
Researcher Data Description Analytical Tools Used 
Hannan and Berger (1991) The United States of America 
September 1983 -December 1986 
Multinomial Logit Estimation  
Lowe and Rohling (1992) Australia 
January 1986- August 1991 
Simple OLS Regression Analysis 
Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994) 
31 Industrial and Developing Countries (Including 
Sri Lanka) 
January 1980- June 1993 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Borio and Fritz (1995) 12 OECD countries 
 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Moazzami (1999) Canada and the United States of America 
January 1969-December 1995 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Error Correction Analysis 
Winker (1999) Federal Republic of Germany 
January 1975-October 1989 
Marginal Cost Pricing Model 
Co-integration and Error Correction Analysis 
Mojon (2000) Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain 
1979-1998 
Error Correction Analysis 
Mahadeva and Thenuwara 
(1999/2000) 
Sri Lanka 
Jan 1990-December 1999 
Co-integration and Error Correction Analysis 
General Method of Moments 
Toolsema, Strum and de 
Haan (2001) 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain 
January 1980-January 2000 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Error Correction Analysis  
Donnay and Degryse (2001) 12 European Countries 
1980-2000 
Structural VAR Based on the Cholesky 
Decomposition 
Heinemann and Schüler 
(2001) 
EU Member Countries 
March 1995-October 2000 
Error Correction Analysis 
Bredin, Fitzpatrick, and  
O Reilly (2002) 
Ireland 
January 1980-March 2001 
Error Correction Analysis 
Berstein and Fuentes Chile 
1996-2002 
Imperfect Competition Model 
Quadratic Loss Function 
Weth (2002) Germany 
April 1993-December 2000 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Error Correction Analysis 
De Bondt (2002) EU Member Countries 
January 1996-May 2001 
Marginal Cost Pricing Model 
Error Correction Analysis  
VAR 
Mizen and Hofmann (2002) The United Kingdom 
January 1986-July 1999 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Co-integration and Error Correction Analysis 
Petro, McDermott and Tripe New Zealand 
August 1994-July 2001 
Co-integration 
Regime Change Tests 
Humala (2003) Argentina 
June 1993-December 2000 
Co-integration and Error Correction Analysis  
Linear VAR 
Markov Switching VAR 
Burgstaller (2003) Austria 
March 1995-December 2002 
Structural VAR 
 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2003) 
Chile, the United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Five European Countries 
April 1993-September 2002 
Distributed Lag Analysis 
Error Correction Analysis 
Kleimeier and Sander 
(2003) 
Euro zone 
January 1999-May 2003 
VAR 
Co-integration 
Threshold Autoregressive Model 
Tieman (2004) Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
January 1995-February 2004 
Co-integration and Error Correction Analysis 
 
3. Data and Statistical/Econometric Tools Used 
Description of Data 
As indicated earlier, the objective of this paper is to analyse the interest rate pass-through 
process in Sri Lanka and test the speed and magnitude of the pass-through. In order to do so, several 
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interest rate data series are used. However, there is no consistency between the periodicity of data as 
well as the available time periods for each series.  
Daily data are used to address whether there is a one-to-one pass-through from policy interest 
rates to call money market rates or else, to assess at what rate a unit change in policy rates impact 
upon the call money market rates in the short-run and in the long-run. Described below are the daily 
interest rate data series used for this analysis. All interest rates are given in percentages.  
a) REPO – This is the CBSL policy interest rate which effectively regulates minimum rate in the 
overnight call money market. A daily data series is available since the introduction of the Repo 
facility on 04 October 1993. Up to 31 December 2004, the REPO series has 2,935 daily 
observations.   
b) REVREPO – Just as the Repo rate regulates the minimum overnight call money market rate, the 
objective of introducing the Reverse Repo rate was to provide an upper bound for the overnight 
call money market rate. However, its effectiveness in doing so is limited by the availability of 
Government securities available with money market participants. The Reverse Repo facility was 
introduced on 09 November 1998 and up to 31 December 2004, the series contains 1,605 
observations.  
c) REPOAUCWA – With the introduction of more active OMO commencing 03 March 2003, OMO 
participants play a major role in setting the effective rate at the daily OMO auctions within the 
policy interest rate corridor. In view of excess liquidity in the money market during the entire 
period following the introduction of more active OMO, the CBSL has conducted only Repo 
auctions and no Reverse Repo auction. Therefore, this series contains weighted average rate at 
OMO Repo auctions and has 480 observations.  
d) CALLWA – This is the weighted average Call Money Market rate. Although minimum and 
maximum call money market rates are available for a longer time horizon, CALLWA is available 
only from 02 December 1996. The series has 2,110 observations. 
e) EFFECTIVERATE – The existence of several policy interest rates poses the serious problem of 
what policy interest rate should be used to analyse interest rate pass-through from policy rates to 
call money market rates. Although it was quite possible to have used dummy variables to 
determine what policy interest rate is the effective rate under each circumstance, an alternative, 
but arguably similar, method was used to compile a new series of effective interest rates. This was 
done as follows: 
1) Daily excess liquidity estimates were used to determine whether the effective interest rate for 
that particular day was the Repo rate or the Reverse Repo rate. When there was excess 
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liquidity the Repo rate was the effective rate, while when there was no excess liquidity or 
liquidity shortage Reverse Repo rate was considered the effective rate  
2) For the period before the Reverse Repo facility was introduced, the Bank rate was used to fill 
in the gaps, although this may not be a plausible alternative given that the Bank rate was only 
an indicative rate since 1985.   
3) Since the introduction of more active OMO on 03 March 2003, the weighted average Repo 
auction rate is taken as the effective rate. 
The resultant daily data series was named EFFECTIVE RATE.   
Although daily data are used to analyse the interest rate pass-through from policy interest 
rates to call money market rate, such short periodicities are not available to many other interest rate 
variables. Therefore, to address whether there is a one-to-one pass-through from call money market 
rates to commercial bank retail interest rates (lending rates / deposit rates) or else, to examine at what 
rate a unit change in call money market rates impact upon the commercial bank retail interest rates in 
the short-run and in the long-run, as well as to assess whether there is an asymmetry of pass-through 
during different phases of an interest rate cycle the following monthly interest rate series were used. 
Unless otherwise specified, all series had 175 monthly observations commencing June 1990.   
a) CALLWA – Monthly averages of daily weighted average call money market rate comprised this 
series. However, since daily weighted average call money market rates were available only from 
December 1996, this series had only 97 observations. 
b) CALLMID – An attempt was made to elongate the data series on call money market rates by 
using the middle of the minimum and maximum daily call money market rates and then taking the 
monthly averages of these rates. The resultant series was named CALLMID and it was observed 
that this series was almost perfectly correlated with CALLWA for the period they coincided. 
CALLMID was available from October 1993 and contained 133 observations.   
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c) COMAWPR – Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (AWPR) is compiled weekly by the CBSL 
based on information provided by commercial banks regarding new lending to their prime 
customers. These loans are granted by commercial banks usually on a short term basis. Monthly 
averages of weekly AWPR are taken to form this series. 
d) COMLOANPROMID – This is the middle rate of commercial bank lending secured by property 
mortgages. It could be assumed that this series mainly comprises interest rates on long term loans 
such as housing loans. 
e) COMLOANUNSMID – This is the middle rate of commercial bank lending on an unsecured 
basis. High spread between minimum and maximum interest rates on unsecured lending reported 
by commercial banks suggests that this includes not only lending at prime rates but also high 
interest rates on credit facilities such as temporary overdrafts.  
 
f) COMAWDR – The CBSL compiles Average Weighted Deposit rates (AWDR) on a monthly 
basis based on data provided by commercial banks on their existing stock of interest bearing 
deposits.  
g) COMAWFDR – Since December 1996, the CBSL has compiled a series named Average 
Weighted Fixed deposit Rate (AWFDR) based on data provided by commercial banks on their 
existing stock of all term deposits. This series has only 97 observations.  
h) COMSAVMID – This is the middle rate offered on savings deposits of commercial banks.  
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i) UP – This is the dummy variable defined as 1 when the CBSL policy interest rates increased 
during this period over the last period or when policy interest rates have remained unchanged 
during this period after the last change to policy interest rates was upward.  
j) DOWN – This is the dummy variable defined as 1 when the CBSL policy interest rates decreased 
during this period over the last period or when policy interest rates have remained unchanged 
during this period after the last change to policy interest rates was downward.  
Description of Statistical/Econometric Tools Used 
Several statistical methods and econometric tests were carried out to analyse the interest rate 
pass-through process in Sri Lanka. These methods and circumstances which warrant the use of such 
tests are explained below: 
a) Descriptive statistics – Descriptive statistics of all time series used are obtained in order to 
observe the nature of each series. This included mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum.  
b) Correlation – Simple coefficients of correlation are used to derive to the extent of which interest 
rate series are correlated. Although this may be a good first indicator of the presence or the 
absence of interest rate pass-through, using contemporaneous series do not allow measuring any 
lag effects involved.  
c) Unit root tests – All time series are subject to stationarity tests prior to using these series in 
econometric analysis, in order to avoid spurious regressions. Unit root tests are carried out to test 
whether the series are level stationary (I(0)) or first difference  stationary (I(1)). If a series is 
found to be I(1) then first differences may have to be used in analysing the relationships. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are used to test for stationarity. Results of these tests were 
confirmed by Phillips-Perron tests. Although more sophisticated econometric procedures to test 
for stationarity have been introduced, for instance, by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin 
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(KPSS) where the null hypothesis is stationarity, these latter methods were not used in the present 
analysis.  
d) Causality tests – Causality tests introduced by Granger could be used to identify whether policy 
rates precede changes in money market rates or whether changes in money market rates prompt 
policy rate changes. Unexpected direction of causality may indicate serious deficiencies in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
e) Distributed lag modelling – Distributed lag models are used to observe how the effect of a shock 
to exogenous variable is reflected on the endogenous variable over time. Two popular methods 
are the Koyck approach and the Almon approach. Koyck distributed lag model assumes that the 
effect declines geometrically as the lag lengthens, an assumption which may be too restrictive in 
some instances. Therefore, the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) approach introduced by Almon 
is used instead. 
f) Co-integration – If two time series are found to be I(1), they may be tested for co-integration. 
Regression analysis using co-integrated time series are said to produce non-spurious results. 
Procedures suggested by Engel and Granger as well as Johansen are used to test for the existence 
of co-integrating relationships.   
g) Error correction analysis – Given a co-integrated relationship, error correction models are used to 
analyse the short-term dynamics around a possible long-term equilibrium relationship between 
time series. Simple error correction models as suggested by Engel and Granger are used for this 
purpose.  
h) Hypothesis tests – Simple hypothesis tests are carried out to verify whether the pass-through is 
asymmetric over an interest rate cycle, and between deposit rates and lending rates. Wald 
coefficient tests are used to impose and test restrictions under the null hypotheses. 
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
 In this chapter, the data described in the previous chanper are used to carry out the analysis of 
the interest rate pass-through process in Sri Lanka by employing the statistical and econometric 
methods explained earlier. The analysis is conducted in two stages. First, the pass-through from the 
CBSL policy interest rates to the call money market rates will be looked at. The pass-through process 
from call money market rates to commercial bank retail lending and deposit rates will be dealt with 
thereafter.   
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From Policy Rates to Money Market Rate 
 In analysing the interest rate pass-through from policy interest rates to money market rates, 
five daily data series have been used. Descriptive statistics of these series are given in Table 2. 
Table 2:  
Descriptive Statistics 
Daily Interest Rates 
Series Period Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
REPO 10/04/1993-
12/31/2004 
11.3296 2.9983 7.0000 20.0000 
REVREPO 11/09/1998-
12/31/2004 
13.3611 3.7346 8.5000 23.0000 
REPOAUCWA 03/03/2003-
12/31/2004 
7.6274 0.6905 7.0100 9.3300 
EFFECTIVERATE 12/02/1996-
12/31/2004 
11.3793 3.7929 7.0000 23.0000 
CALLWA 12/02/1996-
12/31/2004 
12.3833 4.0642 7.2500 29.5400 
 Descriptive statistics show some early indications that CALLWA has, on average, remained 
between REPO and REVREPO, although with higher volatility. Lower mean and standard deviation 
of REPOAUCWA are due to the fact that this series is shorter than other series and only covers a low 
interest rate regime.  
As explained earlier, for several years, the CBSL‟s policy interest rates, i.e., the Repo rate and 
the Reverse Repo rate   have been used as the key monetary policy variables, particularly, influencing 
the behaviour of the call money market rate. Therefore, a good starting point for this analysis is to test 
whether the CBSL has set the direction for the behaviour of call money market rates or whether the 
CBSL has followed the behaviour of call money market rates by changing policy interest rates after 
call money market rates are adjusted automatically to suit changing economic and financial 
conditions. To test these competing hypotheses, Granger causality tests were carried out.  
Table 3:  
Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 12/02/1996 12/31/2004   
Lags: 10 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  CALLWA does not Granger Cause REPO 2100  0.97864  0.45980 
  REPO does not Granger Cause CALLWA  11.0459  0.00000 
Sample: 11/09/1996 12/31/2004   
Lags: 10 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  CALLWA does not Granger Cause REVREPO 1595  1.00337  0.43811 
  REVREPO does not Granger Cause CALLWA  10.8346  0.00000 
Causality tests showed that there is unidirectional causality from REPO to CALLWA and also 
from REVREPO to CALLWA. There is no causality from CALLWA to either REPO or REVREPO. 
These results clearly indicate that the Repo rate and the Reverse Repo rate have provided direction to 
the behaviour of the overnight call money market rate.  
 20 
Cross correlations are good indicators to measure the degree of pass-through between 
contemporaneous data. The correlation matrix given below shows that CALLWA is closely correlated 
with the CBSL policy rates as well as the EFFECTIVERATE series created by combining 
REPO,REVREPO and REPOAUCWA and liquidity conditions in the money market. 
Table 4: 
Correlation Matrix for Daily Interest Rates  
Maximum Sample: 12/02/1996-12/31/2004 
 REPO REVREPO EFFECTIVERATE CALLWA 
REPO 1.0000 0.9608 0.9350 0.9034 
REVREPO 0.9608 1.0000 0.9457 0.9488 
EFFECTIVERATE 0.9350 0.9457 1.0000 0.9262 
CALLWA 0.9034 0.9488 0.9262 1.0000 
  The final analysis of the interest rate pass-through from policy interest rates to money market 
rates is expected to be conducted using the two series CALLWA and EFFECTIVERATE. These 
series are then tested for stationarity in order to avoid spurious regressions. ADF tests showed that 
both CALLWA and EFFECTIVERATE are stationary, i.e., I(0), while Phillips-Perron tests confirmed 
this finding.   
Table 5: 
Unit Root Tests 
Daily Interest Rates 
Series No. of Lags Deterministic Components ADF Test Statistic 
Constant Trend 
EFFECTIVERATE (Level) 4 Significant Insignificant -3.6896* 
CALLWA (Level) 4 Significant Insignificant -3.7236* 
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.  
The results were confirmed by Phillips-Perron tests, which used longer truncation lag lengths.  
In order to quantify the size and speed of interest rate pass-through from EFFECTIVERATE 
to CALLWA, a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) model was fitted. Preliminary experiments with 
PDLs with long lags suggested that using only 10 lags is sufficient to capture the pass-through process 
from EFFECTIVERATE to CALLWA. Also, the model initially imposed no end constraints in order 
to allow the model itself to determine the shape of the polynomial. A second degree polynomial 
distributed lag model was found to be appropriate for the analysis. The estimated relationship could 
be written as: 
CALLWAt = α + β1 PDL01t + β2 PDL02t + β3 PDL03t + εt 
     Where;  
   PDL01t =  

k
i 0
EFFECTIVERATEt-i 
   PDL02t = 

k
i 0
 i  EFFECTIVERATEt-i 
   PDL03t =  

k
i 0
 i2  EFFECTIVERATEt-i 
where i is the length of the lag and k is the maximum length of the lag.  
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 The results of the PDL model are given in Table 6:   
Table 6: 
Pass-through from Policy Rates to the Call Money Market Rate 
 
Sample(adjusted): 12/02/1996 12/31/2004 
Included observations: 2110 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Probability 
C  0.7315   0.0988  7.4027  0.0000 
PDL01  0.0403   0.0101  3.9861  0.0001 
PDL02 -0.0299   0.0024 -12.3909  0.0000 
PDL03  0.0053   0.0010  5.2320  0.0000 
Lag Distribution of   
EFFECTIVERATE 
 i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
.               *|   0  0.3219  0.0194  16.6054 
.           *    |   1  0.2444  0.0114  21.3855 
.        *       |   2  0.1776  0.0074  24.1604 
.     *          |   3  0.1212  0.0078  15.6088 
.   *            |   4  0.0755  0.0094  8.0204 
. *              |   5  0.0403  0.0101  3.9861 
.*               |   6  0.0156  0.0094  1.6588 
*                |   7  0.0015  0.0078  0.1949 
*                |   8 -0.0020  0.0074 -0.2755 
.*               |   9  0.0050  0.0114  0.4361 
.*               |   10  0.0226  0.0194  1.1634 
 Sum of Lags   1.0235  0.0082  124.0930 
Adj R2 = 0.8807  F-statistic=5192.55  
 The constant term and all three PDLs in the PDL equation are significant confirming that a 
second degree polynomial is an appropriate fit to model the relationship. The lag distribution of 
EFFECTIVERATE shows that EFFECTIVERATE is passed-through to CALLWA significantly 
within the first seven time periods (0-6) following a change to the EFFECTIVERATE. The sum of 
lags between i = 0 to 6 is 0.9965 indicating a 99.65 per cent pass-through from policy interest rates of 
the CBSL to the CALLWA within the first seven working days (including the day policy rates were 
changed). More than 50 per cent of the change is transmitted to the call money market rate on the first 
two days and the effect builds into the call money market rate over the next few days after an almost 
complete pass-through.  
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the CBSL policy decisions are efficiently 
transmitted to the short end of the money market within a matter of days. Also, there is a complete 
pass-through from policy interest rates to the call money market rate. Therefore, there is no need to 
differentiate between a short-run pass-through and a long-run pass-through with regard to the interest 
rate transmission process from the CBSL policy interest rates to the overnight call money market.  
 
From Money Market Rates to Retail Bank Interest Rates 
 Having established that there is a highly efficient interest rate pass-through process between 
the CBSL policy interest rates and the call money market rate, this section analyses the pass-through 
from the call money market rate to retail interest rates in the commercial banking sector, both on 
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lending as well as on deposits. Monthly series of two representative rates from the call money market, 
three commercial bank lending rates and three commercial bank deposit rates are used for the analysis 
and relevant descriptive statistics are given in Table 7:    
    Table 7: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Monthly Interest Rates 
Series Period Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CALLWA 1996/12-
2004/12 
12.3798 
 
3.9210 7.4800 24.6200 
CALLMID 1993/10-
2004/12 13.4928 4.7980 7.5100 34.5600 
COMAWPR 1990/06-
2004/12 16.2546 3.5063 8.9400 22.8600 
COMLOANPROMID 1990/06-
2004/12 20.1218 1.9010 15.0000 23.5000 
COMLOANUNSMID 1990/06-
2004/12 22.5847 2.4281 18.5000 26.2500 
COMAWDR 1990/06-
2004/12 10.7418 2.7012 4.8400 14.1600 
COMAWFDR 1996/12-
2004/12 10.9527 2.2776 6.8200 14.7000 
COMSAVMID 1990/06-
2004/12 7.9616 1.8024 4.5500 11.2500 
 On average, all commercial bank lending rates are above both call money market rates 
confirming the existence of a mark-up, which is as high as 10 percentage points for unsecured lending 
(COMLOANUNSMID). On the other hand, deposit rates are lower than the call money market rates. 
Taken together, these factors confirm the high interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates 
that prevail in the Sri Lankan banking industry. Except for prime lending (COMAWPR), standard 
deviations of all other commercial bank rates are low, indicating that commercial banks, themselves, 
absorb a part of volatility in the money market; an early sign of low degree of pass-through between 
money market interest rates and retail interest rates.  
 Cross-correlations between monthly interest rate series resulted in some interesting findings. 
First, it was seen that CALLWA and the middle of the maximum and minimum rates of the call 
money market (CALLMID) were closely correlated showing that these series could be used 
interchangeably in our analysis. CALLMID was a longer time series, and could be used in this 
analysis as an excellent proxy for CALLWA. Second, COMAWPR also has a very high degree of 
correlation with call money market rates, while COAWDR and COMAWFDR also show high 
correlations with call market rates. Third, the lowest correlation with call market rates is with loans 
secures by immovable property (COMLOANPROMID), which are of a long-term nature. Finally, it 
could also be seen that all three deposit rates are closely correlated with each other.  
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Table 8: 
Correlation Matrix for Monthly Interest Rates 
Maximum Sample: June 1996-December 2004 
 CALL 
WA 
CALL 
MID 
COM 
AWPR 
COM 
LOAN 
PROMID 
COM 
LOAN 
UNSMID 
COM 
AWDR 
COM 
AWFDR 
COMSAV
MID 
CALLWA 1.0000 0.9994 0.9619 0.2801 0.3710 0.6360 0.7033 0.3900 
CALLMID 0.9994 1.0000 0.7898 0.3644 0.4651 0.5371 0.7040 0.4307 
COMAWPR 0.9619 0.7898 1.0000 0.3655 0.6888 0.8826 0.8131 0.7432 
COMLOANPROMID 0.2801 0.3644 0.3655 1.0000 0.6531 0.4759 0.7159 0.4577 
COMLOANUNSMID 0.3710 0.4651 0.6888 0.6531 1.0000 0.8282 0.8258 0.8368 
COMAWDR 0.6360 0.5371 0.8826 0.4759 0.8282 1.0000 0.9726 0.9014 
COMAWFDR 0.7033 0.7040 0.8131 0.7159 0.8258 0.9726 1.0000 0.8462 
COMSAVMID 0.3900 0.4307 0.7432 0.4577 0.8368 0.9014 0.8462 1.0000 
 Prior to engaging in performing econometric analyses, all variables were subjected to ADF 
Unit root tests to verify their time series properties. The results are given in Table 9.  
Table 9:  
Unit Root Tests (Levels)  
Monthly Interest Rates 
Series Lags Deterministic Components ADF Test Statistic 
Constant Trend 
CALLWA 2 Insignificant Insignificant -0.9216 
CALLMID 4 Significant Insignificant -2.7525 
COMAWPR 4 Significant Significant -2.9961 
COMLOANPROMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -1.0903 
COMLOANUNSMID 4 Significant Significant -2.3928 
COMAWDR 4 Significant Significant -2.9544 
COMAWFDR 2 Insignificant Insignificant -1.2103 
COMSAVMID 4 Significant Significant -2.9768 
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.  
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level. 
 None of the monthly interest rate series was found to be stationary on levels. Therefore, unit 
root tests were carried out on first differences. As indicated below, all first difference series were 
stationary at a very high level of significance, and both the constant and the trend were not significant 
in each series in carrying out unit root tests. It was concluded all series were I(1).  
Table 10: 
Unit Root Tests (First Differences)  
Monthly Interest Rates 
Series Lags Deterministic Components ADF Test Statistic 
Constant Trend 
CALLWA 2 Insignificant Insignificant -5.1555* 
CALLMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.0604* 
COMAWPR 4 Insignificant Insignificant -5.5559* 
COMLOANPROMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.8993* 
COMLOANUNSMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.5740* 
COMAWDR 4 Insignificant Insignificant -3.0380* 
COMAWFDR 2 Insignificant Insignificant -2.8441* 
COMSAVMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -5.0772* 
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.  
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level. 
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Given that monthly interest rates were I(1), a series of simple linear regressions were carried out on 
first differences to assess the size and the significance of the interest rate pass-through from call 
money market rate to retail bank rates. The simple model used is as follows: 
 
Δ Retail Ratet = α +  β1 Δ CALLWAt + εt 
   Where Δ is the first difference operator. 
Results of these regressions are summarized in Table 11.  
Table 11 
Simple Linear Regressions 
 No Lag Sum of Coefficients 
(H0: Σβ1=1) 
α β1 Number of lags 
3 6 9 
Lending Rates      
COMAWPR 
 
0.5132 
(0.0329) 
0.7663 
(0.000036) 
0.8057 
(0.006191) 
0.7297 
(0.000696) 
COMLOANPROMID 
 
-0.1031 
( 0.0633) 
-0.1085 
(0.000000) 
-0.0087 
(0.000000) 
0.0649 
(0.000007) 
COMLOANUNSMID 
 
-0.1691 
(0.0533) 
0.0214 
(0.000000) 
0.0563 
(0.000000) 
0.1980 
(0.000001) 
 
Deposit Rates      
COMAWDR -0.0703 
(0.0205) 
0.0289 
(0.0147) 
0.1324 
(0.000000) 
0.1929 
(0.000000) 
0.2595 
(0.000000) 
COMAWFDR -0.0646 
(0.0272) 
0.0525 
(0.0194) 
0.2020 
(0.000000) 
0.2794 
(0.000000) 
0.3753 
(0.000000) 
COMSAVMID -0.0339 
(0.0390) 
0.0140 
(0.0279) 
0.0607 
(0.000000) 
0.2342 
(0.000000) 
0.2386 
(0.000000) 
Note:  
Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates for α and β1, while probability values for  H0: Σβ1=1 
are given in parentheses below the sum of lagged coefficients.  
 
 Regression results showed that with regard to lending rates, the degree of interest rate pass-
through from call market rates was quite high for prime lending rates (COMAWPR). While 50 per 
cent of a percentage change in call money market rates is felt on AWPR immediately, the 
accumulated pass-through increases continuously until around 6 months after a change. However, in 
the case of loans secured by property, the coefficients do not even have the expected sign until after a 
lag of 9 months. Even at 9 months, sum of coefficients stands at 0.06 indicating that interest rates on 
long term loans are extremely rigid and the level of pass-through is very low. Interest rates on 
unsecured loans are also quite rigid and after a lag of 10 months, only 20 per cent of a percentage 
change in call money rates is reflected in the changes in rates on unsecured loans. In the case of 
deposit rates, the degree of pass-through is quite low initially, but increases within 9 months to around 
20-40 per cent of the change. The tests carried out to test the hypothesis that Σβ1 = 1, show that the 
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Given that all interest rate series used in this analysis are I(1), it is appropriate to test whether 
the linear relationships between these variables are co-integrated. This is done using the methodology 
suggested by Engel and Granger. The test involves running regressions of the type, 
  Retail Ratet = α + β CALLMIDt + εt 
to obtain the co-integrating vectors 
εt = (Retail Ratet - α - β CALLMIDt)  
and use the ADF test on the residual series εt. However, since estimated εt are based on the 
estimated co-integrating parameter β, using the ADF critical significance values to test whether the 
residual series are stationary is not appropriate. Instead, critical values computed by Engel and 
Granger are used, and therefore, the appropriate test is known as the Augmented Engel-Granger 
(AEG) test. Results of the regressions and relevant AEG test statistics are shown in Table 12. 
 The results show that all relationships are co-integrated (although at different levels of 
significance). These regressions are said to represent the long-run relationships and the estimated β 
represent the long-run pass-through from CALLMID to commercial bank retail rates. Accordingly the 
long-run pass-through from call money market rates to prime lending rates is about 57 per cent, while 
rates on long term loans secured by property (COMLOANPROMID) and interest rates on savings 
deposits (COMSAVMID), show the lowest levels of long-run pass-through.  
 
 
Table 12: 
Testing for Co-integration 
Results of Engel-Granger Tests 
 α β AEG Test Statistic 
Lending Rates    
COMAWPR 7.6290 
(0.5508) 
0.5715 
(0.0385) 
-2.9677* 
COMLOANPROMID 18.2985 
(0.4894) 
0.1543 
(0.0342) 
-2.9355* 
COMLOANUNSMID 18.8307 
(0.6026) 
0.2551 
(0.0421) 
-3.3021* 
 
   
Deposit Rates    
COMAWDR 6.1152 
(0.5465) 
0.2803 
(0.0382) 
-3.3292* 
COMAWFDR 5.8334 
(0.5549) 
0.4122 
(0.0426) 
-1.6235*** 
 
COMSAVMID 5.3967 
(0.3945) 
0.1517 
(0.0276) 
-2.3237** 
Notes:  
Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.  
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level. 
***Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 10 per cent level. 
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The existence of co-integrated relationships between call money market rates and retail 
interest rates is confirmed by the results of the Johansen‟s co-integration tests shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: 
Results of the Johansen’s Co-integration Tests 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMAWPR CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.166867  26.19938  15.41  20.04       None ** 
 0.014323  1.918713   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMLOANPROMID CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.113690  17.56604  15.41  20.04       None * 
 0.011322  1.514449   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMLOANUNSMID CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.160955  25.83521  15.41  20.04       None ** 
 0.018584  2.494929   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMAWDR CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.230690  35.26773  15.41  20.04       None ** 
 0.002906  0.387019   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMAWFDR CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.275670  33.69420  15.41  20.04       None ** 
 0.031655  3.055895   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: COMSAVMID CALLMID  
Lags interval: 1 to 1 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
 0.191156  30.91426  15.41  20.04       None ** 
 0.020084  2.698419   3.76   6.65    At most 1 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
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 Having shown that there are long-run equilibrium relationships between each set of variables, 
i.e., the relationships are co-integrated, the next step is to analyse the short-run behaviour of the 
variables using the error correction mechanism (ECM) suggested by Engel and Granger. ECM is 
where the short-run disequilibria shown by the error terms (also known as equilibrium errors) 
obtained from Engel-Granger tests for co-integration are used to tie the short-run behaviour of 
dependent variables to their long-run values. The following ECM equation is used to continue the 
analysis.  
  Δ (Retail Ratet) = α + β1 Δ (CALLMIDt) + β2 εt-1 +ut 
where Δ is the first difference operator, ut is the random error term and εt-1 = Retail Ratet-1 - α 
- β CALLMIDt-1 (i.e., the one period lagged value of the error from the co-integrating regressions 
derived above). ECM equations state that changes in retail rates depend on the changes in CALLMID 
as well as on the equilibrium error terms. If the error term is zero, the model is in equilibrium.  
Table 14: 
Error Correction Mechanism  (ECM) Regressions 
 α β1 β2 AdjR2 
Lending Rates     
COMAWPR  0.1775 
(0.0208) 
-0.0914 
(0.0266) 
0.3558 
COMLOANPROMID  -0.0173 
(0.0239) 
-0.0768 
(0.0350) 
0.0281 
COMLOANUNSMID  -0.0123 
(0.0226) 
-0.0778 
(0.0263) 
0.0544 
 
    
Deposit Rates     
COMAWDR -0.0623 
(0.0157) 
0.0090 
(0.0059) 
-0.0212 
(0.0076) 
0.0525 
COMAWFDR -0.0635 
(0.0239) 
0.0463 
(0.0173) 
-0.0799 
(0.0149) 
0.2765 
COMSAVMID  0.0056 
(0.0104) 
-0.0563 
(0.0184) 
0.0466 
Note:  
Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Estimated coefficients β1 could be interpreted as short-run adjustments. Similar to the findings 
earlier in this section, the ECM equations also suggest a sluggish pass-through from call money 
market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates. Rates on loans to prime customers show the 
highest short-run pass-through of 0.18 per cent, while various deposit rates show very slow 
adjustments. Also, low R2 values suggest that several other factors affect the interest rate pass-through 
process.    
 Some researchers have found that in certain countries when policy interest rates are rising, 
retail lending rates respond quickly but deposit rates remain sluggish, while the opposite is true when 
policy interest rates are declining. Similar test using Sri Lankan data were carried out to check 
whether this is true for Sri Lanka as well. The model used is: 
Δ Retail Ratet = α + β1 Δ UP + β2 Δ DOWN + εt 
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where Δ is the first difference operator, UP is a dummy variable (1 when the Policy interest 
Rate increases) multiplied by CALLWA, and DOWN is a dummy variable (1 when the policy rate 
decreases) multiplied by CALLWA (See data description in Chapter 3).  The results from these 
regressions are provided in Table 15.   
   Table 15:  
Tests of Symmetrical Responses 
 α β1 β2 Sig. Level H0: β1=β2 
Lending Rates     
COMAWPR  0.5074 
(0.0337) 
0.5165 
(0.0332) 
0.4097 
COMLOANPROMID  -0.0940 
(0.0649) 
-0.1083 
(0.0639) 
0.5012 
COMLOANUNSMID  -0.1853 
(0.0542) 
-0.1598 
(0.0534) 
0.1528 
 
    
Deposit Rates     
COMAWDR -0.0701 
(0.0206) 
0.0278 
(0.0151) 
0.0295 
(0.0149) 
0.7246 
COMAWFDR -0.0640 
(0.0273) 
0.0498 
(0.0199) 
0.0541 
(0.0196) 
0.5091 
COMSAVMID  0.0104 
(0.0284) 
0.0183 
(0.0280) 
0.3985 
Note:  
Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 
The results show that estimated values for B1 are marginally lower than B2, suggesting that 
interest rates are more flexible downward. Lowe and Rohling, who tested for asymmetry of pass-
through using Australian data also found a similar relationship. However, in none of the cases, the 
hypothesis that retail interest rates respond symmetrically could be rejected. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that there is no evidence that in Sri Lanka, commercial bank retail interest rates respond 
asymmetrically during different phases of the interest rate cycle. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the pass-through from call money market rates to both 
lending rates as well as deposit interest rates of commercial banks are sluggish and incomplete. The 
only exception is perhaps the rates on lending to prime customers, which show a faster and closer 
pass-through. However, it must be noted that COMAWDR and COMAWFDR are stock variables, 
while COMAWPR is a flow variable, which, by definition, captures adjustments in the money market 
rates faster. Also, there is no evidence to conclude that commercial bank retail interest rates react 
differently to increases and decreases of money market interest rates.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 Findings in Chapter 4 indicate that although there is a rapid and almost complete pass-through 
from the Central Bank policy interest rates to call money market rates, the pass-through from call 
money market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates is sluggish and incomplete. The sluggish 
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and incomplete pass-through poses a challenge to the Central Bank as it hinders the achievement of its 
monetary policy objectives as desired.  
 Studies have suggested several possible reasons for sluggish adjustments in commercial bank 
retail interest rates. These include the lack of competition in the financial system, collusive behaviour 
of banks, adverse selection and moral hazard problems, menu costs of commercial banks, switching 
costs to customers, inelasticity of demand for bank services, risk sharing behaviour, consumer 
irrationality, and the high proportion of fixed-rate loans and deposits. These reasons are possibly 
inter-related and also could be competing. This aspect, however, is beyond the scope of the present 
study, but contains future research opportunities for testing the validity of each of these arguments in 
the Sri Lankan context.   
 Potential research related to the present study include analysing the term structure of interest 
rates and broadening the study to cover the developments in the Treasury bill and Treasury bond 
markets. An in-depth study into modelling the monetary transmission mechanism in Sri Lanka 
analysing each of the relevant transmission channels is yet to be undertaken. 
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